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The competitiveness of a national economy structurally depends on the efficiency 
and quality of financial intermediation, which is in a close relationship with 
the competitiveness of the banking system. In our opinion, banking system 
competitiveness can best be captured through the sustained supportive role of the 
banking system in economic growth, which in practice is implemented through the 
efficient allocation of financial resources. In the course of our research we developed 
an index designed to measure the competitiveness of European banking systems 
which, in our understanding, is the first of its kind. It models competitiveness from 
two different or even conflicting perspectives – from the consumer and from the 
investor side alike – and synthesizes the results received. Our analysis points out 
that the Hungarian banking system lags significantly behind its peers with respect 
to the price-setting of loans to households, digitalisation and operational efficiency, 
and presents the sources of competitive advantage in national economies with 
a competitive banking system in place.  
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E51, O40, E44
Keywords: finance, capital attractiveness, stability, growth, competitiveness
1. Introduction
Our analysis is intended to provide a systematic comparison between the banking 
systems of European countries from the perspective of competitiveness. The 
competitiveness of a national economy hinges on a multitude of institutional, 
geographical, material and human factors, of which the financial intermediary 
system in general and financial intermediaries in particular play a pivotal role. The 
link between the financial system and economic development is a central topic 
in the influential book by Gerschenkron (1962), in which the author discusses the 
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models applied in different eras for the financing of industrialisation and hence, 
economic convergence. Financial mediation is commonly interpreted as the 
collection and efficient allocation of financial resources and the drawbacks arising 
from the imperfections of the process were pointed out early on by Hicks (1935). 
The adequate operation of the process benefits all stakeholders: savings increase, 
investment thrives and the banking system itself achieves the profitability required 
for performing its activity over the long run. Thus, the financial intermediary system 
greatly contributes to sustainable and dynamic economic growth1 and hence, 
competitiveness. For a detailed analysis of this considerably simplified thought 
process, we need to examine two questions:
a)  How can we characterise and measure the competitiveness of a country’s banking 
system in and of itself?
b)  What are the channels through which the banking system contributes to the 
competitiveness of the national economy as a whole?
Our analysis is focused on the first question. We hope that the proper interpretation 
of banking system competitiveness and an in-depth analysis of the structural 
features of a given banking system facilitates a better understanding not only of 
financial systems but of whole economies. In addition, a transparent international 
comparison may assist in identifying the development opportunities available to 
the Hungarian banking system, which endeavour is consistent with the statutory 
mandates of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB). 
The first dilemma we faced during our investigation is the interpretation and 
measurability of banking system competitiveness. Banking system competitiveness 
is not a clearly defined or self-evident term. Our analyses started out with the 
premise that the goal of financial intermediation – and hence, the criterion of 
a well-functioning banking system – is the efficient allocation of financial resources 
that supports growth in a sustainable manner over the long term. The indicators 
used for measuring competitiveness were derived from this interpretation. This 
is consistent with the MNB’s previously published study on the 10 measures of 
a well-functioning Hungarian banking system (MNB 2014), which identifies healthy 
lending, the importance of the self-financing of the banking system, supporting 
growth, and the potential behind efficiency improvement and innovation among 
the key factors at play. These dimensions need to be quantified and aggregated for 
the comparison of banking system competitiveness over time and across countries.
With respect to measurability – accepting the above-mentioned concept of banking 
system competitiveness – the selection of indicators and their optimal values 
1  The issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of Competitiveness and Growth: The role of financial 
intermediation in growth (Banai et al. 2016).
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pose a challenge. The criteria system required for efficient financial allocation 
can be examined from the perspective of numerous participants. The features of 
financial intermediation can be inspected from the side of the state, the regulatory 
body, consumers and banks alike and even conflicting aspects can be considered. 
Looking at the financial system under market conditions, we found that it was 
through the analysis of the consumer side (households and corporations) and 
the infrastructure provider side that we could most easily interpret and measure 
efficient and sustainable resource allocation – as the definition of banking system 
competitiveness. This approach permitted us to also take into account such 
environmental and demand factors that play a decisive role not only in the structural 
features of a national economy but also in the competitiveness of its banking 
system. Banks are less capable of influencing developments in these factors over 
the medium term than the state and regulatory authorities are. 
Bearing in mind the conflicting aspects of the consumer and of the structural side of 
financial intermediation, in our study we approach banking system competitiveness 
separately from these two angles: 
•  Financing corporations and households: From the perspective of households and 
corporations, the key question is whether the banking system fulfils its financial 
intermediation role properly and supports the financial involvement of customers. 
In our view, therefore, demand side competitiveness can best be captured in the 
accessibility, quality and price setting dimensions; in other words, when financial 
products become broadly available in high quality and at an affordable price. 
Accordingly, an analysis of the consumer side can shed light on which countries 
rational customers would prefer in case of a hypothetical choice between banking 
systems. 
•  Capital attractiveness: As regards bank owners and investors, we selected five 
determinants that may play a leading role when these actors decide on continuing 
or enlarging their activity. These are: stability, profitability, operating and tax 
environment, prospects of financial deepening, technology and efficiency. 
In constructing the corporate and finance indices, we also included a number 
of indicators that are not solely determined by the demand side but their value 
emerges from an equilibrium state between demand and supply. For example, 
pricing indicators reflect consumers’ demand side perception on the one hand but 
on the other hand, they also indicate the diversification of the financial system and 
the intensity of the competition. 
The fact that the key stakeholders – especially consumers and owners of the 
banking system – are driven by different, sometimes conflicting motives regarding 
competitiveness complicates the task even further. One of the most obvious 
8 Studies
Péter Asztalos – Gábor Horváth – Štefan Krakovský – Tamás Tóth
example is the conflict of interest in pricing: while borrowers seek loans with the 
lowest possible margin and interest rate, the banking system and its owners strive 
to achieve the highest possible margins and hence, to maximise their profitability 
and capital accumulation capacity. Similarly, consumers demand easy access to 
services but an excessively large branch network may deteriorate the banking 
system’s efficiency through high maintenance costs. It should also be considered 
that investors may often prefer higher returns to optimal allocation. Finally, while 
consumers benefit from a more mature, deeper and more competitive banking 
market, it may be less attractive to investors in view of the limited growth potential 
it offers.
The static contradiction between consumer side and investor side competitiveness, 
however, shifts over time and in the long run the factors above may mutually 
reinforce each other. If a given country’s ability to attract capital is limited and thus 
it cannot develop an adequate banking infrastructure, willingness to participate 
in the financial system will be scant and the efficiency of financial intermediation, 
in turn, will be lower. More expensive and lower quality service and diminishing 
access deteriorate the efficiency of operations, which in turn reduces the return on 
equity and undermines the ability to attract capital even further. Breaking out of 
this vicious circle is only possible through somewhat higher prices until the cost of 
capital associated with the developing infrastructure is recovered. In the long run, 
however, both perspectives (consumer and investor) must be satisfied in order to 
ensure that the banking system functions sustainably and supports growth in an 
efficient manner. With that in mind, the results of the two indices should also be 
considered in conjunction with one another in order to identify the countries that 
were most successful in reconciling these two, often conflicting perspectives in the 
operation of the banking system.
While competitiveness is essentially based on structural factors and is interpreted 
over the long term (Porter 1998), cyclical indicators may also have high information 
content (Nafzinger 2006). The pro-cyclicality observed in the operation of the 
banking system is reflected in the lending activity and in risk-based competition 
and may contribute significantly to the fluctuations of economic growth (Claessens 
2009). This may damage the economy by accelerating the booming of bubbles 
before crises; thereby, deepening and even protracting the subsequent recession. 
More severe crises and protracted recovery can also affect the long-term average 
of economic growth; therefore, it also affects competitiveness in its sense as 
a long-term potential for development (Hatzichronoglou 1996). Since banking 
system competitiveness means, according to our definition, efficient financial 
allocation, it cannot characterise a pro-cyclical banking system – an evaluation 
across financial cycles would pinpoint the growth sacrifices associated with the 
subdued risk appetite stemming from overheated lending and ballooning risk costs. 
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Consequently, if a banking system proves to be competitive with respect to the two 
aspects mentioned above, this would also imply a reduced probability of pro-cyclical 
operation; in other words, the banking system would carry out the allocation of 
resources in a stable and prudent manner – i.e. efficiently in a broad sense – even 
in the long run.
In the following section we discuss the methodological issues that arose as we 
were constructing the indicator system for the measuring of banking system 
competitiveness. Next we present the indicators used for surveying the two different 
sides, explain the reasons for their selection and present the results received. Section 
five describes the combined result of the two approaches and finally, we summarise 
the results and identify a number of potential directions for further research. 
2. Methodology
Geographically, the subject matter – setting up a banking system competitiveness 
ranking – covers the Member States of the European Union as the consistency and 
comparability of the data available are limited to EU Member States. We strived to 
ensure that the comparison of the areas to be covered was based on, as far as possible, 
objective data. Most indicators of our data sources derive from the World Bank’s 
Global Findex Database and from the European Central Bank’s Survey on the Access to 
Finance of Enterprises (SAFE). In addition, our sources include OECD, Eurostat, Standard 
& Poor’s and all major general competitiveness rankings (World Economic Forum 
Global Competitiveness Report, World Competitiveness Yearbook, Doing Business). 
For the aggregation of the data measuring banking system competitiveness and for 
the construction of the indicators we defined, in line with the international practice, 
a multi-level hierarchy:
I.  Basic indicator: a quantitative value describing a specific feature of the banking 
operation or environment, which in and of itself can consider multiple factors 
(e.g. I.A.1. Bank branches per 100 thousand adults).
II.  Sub-pillar: a group of basic indicators clustered around the same theme, covering 
a well-defined area of the banking operation or environment (e.g. I.A. Banking 
infrastructure).
III.  Main pillar: a group of sub-pillars clustered around the same theme, covering 
a comprehensive area of banking operation. It is used only in the area of 
household and corporate finance (e.g. I. Access).
IV.  Index: an indicator that condenses into a single value the level of banking system 
competitiveness from a given aspect (e.g. Corporate and Household Finance 
Index).
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Before constructing the indices capturing the competitiveness of the banking 
system, three key questions need to be clarified:
1)  What are the optimal values of the basic indicators?
2)  How are the scores calculated for the basic indicators?
3)  What weighting is used to construct an index from the basic indicators?
For building the indices we need to define which part of the scale should be 
considered optimal (maximum, minimum or average value) in the case of each 
basic indicator. Although in most cases the optimal value is obvious, other times 
the answer is less straightforward, either because it cannot be decided whether 
the higher or the lower level is the more favourable, or a value other than the two 
extreme values appears to be more optimal (non-linear scale). The former dilemma 
may arise in relation to price setting and infrastructure. However, we resolved these 
problems by examining two separate indices from the consumer side and from the 
investor side of the banking system and we could clearly determine which value 
was more favourable from the two different perspectives. The second dilemma 
involved certain indicators calculated by us where the linear nature of the scale was 
questionable. Since due to the lack of a target value it was not objectively feasible 
to define optimal ranges, in such cases we used the sample mean to define the 
optimum and the countries were scored based on their deviation from the mean. 
Figure 1
Structure of the MNB Banking System Competitiveness Index
Basic indicators
MNB Banking System Competitiveness Index
Corporate and Household Financing Index Capital Attractiveness Index
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To ensure the transparency of the evaluation, our goal was to score the results 
on a scale of 0–100 for each basic indicator, factoring in – besides the relative 
values – the deviation of the sample as well. For standardising the rough values 
of the basic indicators and for performing the subsequent scoring, we reviewed 
the methodologies used by the most major international competitiveness indices:
a)  World Bank (WB) – Doing Business (DB): this ranking applies the distance to 
frontier methodology, where 0 represents the worst performer and 100 the best 
performer, while countries in between are ranked by using the following formula 
(World Bank 2017):
([worst score] – [country score]) / ([worst score] – [best score]) *100
b)  World Economic Forum (WEF) – Global Competitiveness Report (GCR): similar to 
the Doing Business ranking, its methodology is based on the distance to frontier 
principle, but the score is indicated on a scale from 1 to 7 (Schwab 2017): 
6 * (([country score] – [sample minimum]) / ([sample maximum]  
– [sample minimum])) + 1
c)  IMD – World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY): its main focus is on the ranking 
and although it standardises basic indicators, it does not generate scores from 
them (IMD 2017).
Neither of the formulas shown above could fully meet our prior expectations, 
primarily because, in our opinion, they failed to adequately reflect the dispersion 
of data. The methodology based on the distance to frontier principle (WB, WEF) 
exaggerates the differences in rough data by projecting the results onto the full 
scale (0–100) in all cases irrespective of the dispersion of the given sample. The 
methodology applied by the IMD, in turn, is primarily suitable for ranking without 
relying on comparable scores such as those we envisaged.
In order to factor in the deviation of data, we introduced the following formula for 
converting the basic indicators into scores:
MAX (0; 100 – {([best score] – [country score]) / [deviation]} * [P]),
where the value of the [P] parameter indicates the weight of “punishment” for the 
deviation from the best score. 
Accordingly, our methodology factors in the deviation of the given sample in such 
a way that it deducts points in proportion to the distance from the highest score. 
Scores are indicated on a scale from 0 to 100, where the country with the best 
performance always receives the maximum 100 points; however, 0 does not emerge 
in the case of all indicators, a 0 score is given only when the distance from the 
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best score amounts to more than one standard deviations. Another advantage 
of this methodology is the fact that, in function of the deviation, the value of the 
“penalty” can be parameterised. In our calculations, we counted with a value of 
[P] = 25, which means that the results lying at 4 (or more) standard deviations from 
the best value will receive a score of 0. As mentioned before, in the case of some 
indicators it was not possible to define a linear scale. In such cases, distance from 
the mean (as optimum) equalled 1 standard deviation, with [P] = 12.5. With this 
approach we successfully normalised most countries evenly on a scale of 0–100. 
With respect to the weighting of the basic indicators and the pillars, the international 
methodologies are consistent and acceptable to us (World Bank 2017; Schwab 
2017; IMD 2017). Each ranking under review generates its final index with the 
application of the arithmetic mean, for the purposes of which basic indicators and 
pillars are assigned the same weight. The advantage of this methodology is that 
it is transparent and reproducible and that it adequately addresses the problems 
arising from potential data shortages. The final weighting of the index can be 
performed with various methods depending on what is considered to be the basis 
of the calculation (basic indicators, sub-pillars or main pillars). In our calculations, 
we assigned the same weights to sub-pillars, because they consist of thematically 
arranged basic indicators, address the problems arising from data shortages and 
at the same time, they are more numerous than main pillars, the analysis of which 
is hindered by the broadness of the areas covered by them. We also tested for 
robustness weighting methodologies that are based on the basic indicators and 
the main pillars; however, the results thus received did not differ significantly from 
those yielded by our selected methodology.
3. Corporate and Household Financing Index (CHFI)
We started out from the fact that, from the perspective of consumers, a banking 
system can be considered competitive if it offers high quality, broadly available 
services at an adequate and manageable price to retail and corporate customers 
alike; in other words, the cost of finances does not render investment projects 
impossible. Accordingly, in measuring the consumer side we identified three 
different dimensions (access, quality, pricing) with each dimension forming a main 
pillar. Each main pillar was broken down further to three sub-pillars, also taking into 
account corporate and retail oriented indicators (Table 1). The pricing sub-pillar 
includes numerous indicators whose value is not solely determined by demand 
side factors, but emerges from an equilibrium state between demand and supply. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the demand side receives priority in the corporate 
and household finance index and accordingly, in analysing the pricing of banking 
products the focus is on consumers’ perception.
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Table 1
Structure of the MNB Corporate and Household Financing Index
Main pillars
I. Access II. Quality III. Pricing
Sub-
pillars
I.A Banking infrastructure II.A Quality of banking 
services
III.A Pricing of corporate 
loans and deposits
I.B Prevalence of banking 
products
II.B Bank digitalisation III.B Pricing of retail loans 
and deposits
I.C Access to bank loans II.C Financial literacy III.C Perception of banks’ 
price setting
The access main pillar is intended to represent access to banking services and 
it also involves infrastructure, the prevalence of banking products and lending 
activity. Banking infrastructure characterises the physical and digital availability and 
coverage of the financial system and it is measured by the branch and ATM coverage 
and by the scope of the credit information system. The latter provides valuable 
assistance to banks in that it largely determines the actual access to finance on the 
customer side. While these items increase banks’ costs significantly, they remain 
principal factors in consumers’ recourse to banking services. That notwithstanding, 
as the significance of the physical infrastructure decreases in line with the gaining 
ground of digitalisation, its prevalence may not be a truly reliable measure of 
competitiveness. Identifying the optimal level of the branch network is beyond the 
scope of our analysis; therefore, for the sake of simplicity we assumed that a larger 
branch network tends to be an advantage on the consumer side. In selecting our 
basic indicators, we discarded the number of commercial banks because we were 
unable to determine clearly the optimal number of banks. 
The prevalence of banking products obviously plays a role in the competitiveness 
of the banking system as it shows what portion of potential consumers has become 
customers; i.e. it is a yardstick for measuring the success of financial inclusion. 
While the demand factor is particularly dominant in this pillar, availability also has 
a relevance. We quantified this based on the prevalence of bank accounts and debit 
cards and the features of their use (frequency of card payments, income transferred 
to bank account), strictly in relation to the retail segment. The number of these 
indicators can be increased; however, we found that the inclusion of more variables 
is redundant as they show a significantly positive covariance. We also considered to 
include the number of deposit accounts and the proportion of indebted household 
indicators but in their case, we did not have data available for a sufficient number 
of countries.
Access to bank loans, in essence, is also a measure of the prevalence of banking 
services, but due to its significance we included it in a separate sub-pillar that 
encompassed both the corporate and the retail sectors. In addition to the pricing 
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of loans, this sub-pillar also measures the percentage of companies who took out 
a new or renewed an old bank loan, the ease of access to loans and the proportion 
of completely approved applications. The percentage of companies who took out 
a new or renewed an old bank loan simply indicates financial depth and it is well 
complemented by the rest of the indicators which, to a certain degree, points 
to a harmony between banks and the private sector. A greater percentage of 
completely approved loan applications suggests, on the one hand, the applicants’ 
increased financial awareness and on the other hand, the cyclical harmony between 
demand and supply. The ease of access to loans is a subjective indicator, but we 
found it appropriate regardless, as in this case it is the customer’s individual 
perception that matters, which may vary across countries and in function of financial 
literacy. Moreover, the proportion of companies feels that the availability of bank 
loans improved. Due to inadequate geographical coverage, upon selecting the basic 
indicators we discarded the ECB’s indicator that shows the proportion of indebted 
households. 
The main pillar of quality sums up the service quality of the banking system, the 
degree of banking digitalisation and the financial literacy of households and market 
participants. Owing to the topics covered, this area is more difficult to quantify. The 
quality of banking services sub-pillar is the most difficult to measure objectively; 
with 3 indicators, it is designed to measure the corporate sector’s satisfaction with 
banking services and the legal options of consumer protection. Adopted from the 
WEF database, the financial services meeting business needs indicator captures 
company managers’ general perception about the extent to which financial services 
meet individual business needs and as such, it points to an equilibrium between 
demand and supply. The source of the percentage of companies who feel confident 
talking about financing with banks indicator is the ECB’s corporate survey and it 
captures company managers’ general confidence level towards the financial sector. 
Both indicators measure consumer satisfaction in all EU Member States based 
on customers’ subjective assessment of the quality of banking services. This is 
complemented by the same sub-pillar’s strength of legal rights index indicator 
(adopted from the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey), which is an objective 
basic indicator that, based on 12 yes/no questions, factually describes the tools of 
available legal protection in the countries under review. Legal protection, in this 
case, largely signifies companies’ protection against the financial sector (e.g. the 
existence of a financial legal framework or the enforceability of contracts at legal 
forums). In simplified terms, it measures companies’ exposure to banks. In theory, 
a systematic, standardised international comparison of the quality of banking 
services would be conceivable; however, despite its subjective nature, the survey 
was deemed to fit the purpose. Although differences across the countries with 
respect to their expectations of the banking system may distort the international 
comparison, the fact that consumers were polled directly in this regard is completely 
consistent with our position. 
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In examining bank digitalisation, we wished to identify the percentage of individuals 
using the internet for internet banking, the percentage of age 15+ made or received 
digital payments, made payment using mobile phone and made payment using the 
internet. The topic of digitalisation was included in the main pillar of quality for 
two reasons: firstly, since we believe that digital products are largely available in 
the European Union, the number of actual consumers reflects rather the quality 
of the services rendered and banks’ openness than the option of accessing such 
services. Secondly, although we interpreted banking digitalisation as a supplement 
to physical infrastructure at this time, the former may increasingly replace the 
latter in future in line with the growing demand. If it indeed replaces the traditional 
banking infrastructure in the future, its reclassification into the “access” pillar will 
be justified. 
The financial literacy part is intended to gauge consumers’ financial knowledge 
because, in our opinion, customers’ level of understanding regarding their 
finances has an impact on banking system competitiveness. However, the two 
other indicators of the sub-pillar, measures the quality of higher education in 
economics, as it is intended to cover the skills of not only customers, but also the 
banking sector’s human resources. Financial literacy – a sub-pillar that is linked to 
all factors under review – was classified into the main pillar of quality because in our 
opinion, this factor of the external environment plays an important role in the way 
in which the demand side reacts to the innovations reflected in financial products. 
In addition, banks – as the financial institutions nurturing the closest contact with 
households – have a vested interest in expanding customers’ financial awareness, 
as indeed, they can sell more complex and potentially more profitable products to 
customers who are financially literate and more confident in their own financial 
skills. Banks’ failure to contribute to improving their customers’ financial awareness 
– mainly through the transparency of the products offered and through their staff’s 
easy-to-understand but considerable expertise – may reduce the disbursement of 
high-return financial assets on the one hand and undermine market competition 
in the sector on the other hand. Banks’ prudent and customer-friendly behaviour 
plays a critical role in any country where the financial literacy level is low, along 
with the regulations prescribing and the consumer protection measures enforcing 
such conduct. For this reason, the examination and continuous monitoring of 
this area is one of the MNB’s key priorities. The quality of economics training in 
individual countries was captured by the quality of management schools and by 
the percentage of students enrolled in the field of business and administration 
in tertiary education. The latter is a basic indicator that also shows the extent to 
which economics is deemed to be an attractive field by the youth of the given 
country in general. In measuring the quality of the financial educational system, we 
contemplated the use of the number of institutions listed in institutional rankings 
(such as the Financial Times European Business School Ranking, Financial Times 
2017) but eventually we dismissed it because we believe that a highly prestigious 
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institution itself may not necessarily capture the quality of the entire higher 
education sector adequately. In our comparison, it is perhaps the human side of the 
banking sector that received a smaller weight than it should have; its measurement 
therefore leaves ample room for improvement.
Price setting seemingly encompasses easy-to-quantify indicators; however, in 
practice it causes difficulties that, for the sake of international comparability, we 
need to eliminate the differences between the risk spreads of individual countries 
(which are independent of the banking system) and the different monetary policy 
features, which may both pass through to interest rates. In order to resolve this 
dilemma, instead of level-based indicators, we compared the countries’ credit 
spreads and lending and deposit margins. Instead of the absolute level of interest 
rates, in our analysis we applied the 3-month average of the interest rate spreads 
both for the retail and corporate segments and as a result, the general risk of lending 
(including the sovereign CDS spreads of the individual national economies) were 
also reflected in the model. In addition, the pricing of corporate loans and deposits 
covers the difference between the spreads on SME’s and large enterprises as we 
deemed lending to the SME sector – a token of inclusive and sustainable growth 
– equally important as lending to the large enterprise segment. The difference in 
price setting within the two sectors is displayed in the “interest rate spreads on 
loans to SMEs and to large enterprises” indicator, which reflects the different risk 
assessment of the two segments from the creditors’ aspect. Although the interest 
expected of SMEs – as justified by the higher risk – should be somewhat higher, 
an excessive difference crowds out SMEs from the credit market, undermining 
their growth. There are few projects where excessively high cost of capital yields 
a positive net present value. If an SME still decides to go ahead, its ability to make 
payments will be questionable. Accordingly, lending above a certain interest rate 
threshold is counterproductive both in terms of banks’ risk costs and for the national 
economy as a whole. 
We measured the pricing of retail loans and deposits based on our own calculations 
and on the ECB’s database. As a basic indicator, we incorporated the retail lending 
and deposit margin into the sub-pillar, and also examined the interest rate spread 
on the loans, as well as the difference between the APRC and the lending rate. 
Similar to the corporate margin indicator, the former’s content is twofold: the 
interest rate spread shows the difference between the reference rate and the 
lending rate, whereas the difference between the APRC and the lending rate arises 
from a number of ad hoc cost factors. Households’ debt service is proportionate 
to loan pricing. When this pricing is excessive, debt service will be stretched out at 
the outset, potentially giving rise to severe social damages and a confidence crisis 
in case of a stress induced by an exogenous shock. In the long run, institutional 
confidence can only be achieved amid the moderate prices imposed by market 
competition. 
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The perception of banks’ price setting was included in a sub-pillar separate from the 
pricing of loans and deposits, because the former pillar is based on hard-to-measure 
and less comparable indicators, whereas the latter characterises exact interest rate and 
cost levels. Modelling the perception of the corporate sector, the perception of banks’ 
price setting indicator measures the price level of service fees among the consumers. In 
setting up the structure of the sub-pillar, our goal was to map the relationship between 
the corporate sector and the banking system, which in this case indicates corporations’ 
attitudes to banking services. The applied survey-based indicators reflect the opinion of 
company managers. Two of the three basic indicators applied are based on subjective 
and one on objective assessment. In the subjective dimension we attempt to gauge 
the affordability of financial services and the manageability of interest rates. Adopted 
from the WEF Survey, the affordability of financial services indicator shows company 
managers’ subjective assessment of the pricing of banking services. In the indicator 
showing the percentage of companies for whom bank loans are not relevant because 
interest rates or prices are too high, company managers compare the costs of finance 
to their own rates of return; thereby, providing an opinion on the manageability of 
lending rates. The percentage of companies who feel that the cost of financing other 
than interest rates increased indicator, in turn, tries to be a more impartial measure of 
whether company managers perceive changes in price levels in the market of banking 
products compared to the previous year. However, this question causes a certain 
degree of bias as respondents can only offer an opinion on the banks and on the 
products with which they are connected; therefore, a general change in the price 
level could only be measured through proper aggregation. It is unfortunate that the 
data used in this sub-pillar are based, without exception, on surveys. This might be 
because measuring the costs – which are not standardised and are even concealed in 
many cases – is extremely difficult. 
On the whole, the Corporate and Household Financing Index – which calibrates 
banking system competitiveness from the demand side – displays intuitive results 
that correlate positively with the level of development. The best performing 
countries in our ranking were Sweden, the United Kingdom and Finland, while 
Bulgaria, Romania and Greece had the least competitive banking systems from 
the perspective of consumers (Figure 2). The first half of the list was composed of 
Western-European and Scandinavian banking systems; their competitive advantage 
lay primarily in the development of the banking infrastructure and in the high 
degree of digitalisation. The competitive disadvantage of the banking systems 
bringing up the rear was apparent in all three topics; namely, lower quality services 
provided with limited access were combined, in their case, with a relatively high 
cost level. The banking systems of the stragglers typically demonstrated a low level 
of digitalisation; the scope of their services was less known and less utilised by their 
customers and their lending rates – partly because of the countries’ higher sovereign 
risk premiums – were relatively high. The median of CCE countries surpassed the EU 
median in the case of two sub-pillars (banking infrastructure and service quality).
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With a score of 45.0, Hungary finished 24th among the European Union Member 
States. Hungary’s result fell behind that of the EU Member States (56.7) and 
CEE countries2 (47.9) by 11.7 and 2.9 points, respectively. The primary source 
of Hungary’s competitive disadvantage can be best identified in the high pricing 
of household loans, the lag in digitalisation and the low prevalence of banking 
products, while in terms of the quality of banking services, the perception of banks’ 
price setting and financial literacy, the competitive position of Hungary can be 
considered adequate (Figure 3). The lag in digitalisation can be attributed to reasons 
associated with demand and supply alike; indeed, online banking has not gained 
ground in Hungary so far (even though the possibility is ensured), although the 
required IT developments may have been delayed by banks’ significant losses during 
the crisis. The inadequate prevalence of banking products may be explained by the 
precarious balance between demand and supply and by the high demand for cash 
(despite the gaining ground of card payments), which could be offset by enhancing 
the infrastructure and by improving financial literacy. 
2  CEE region means the average of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia.
Figure 2
Results of the Corporate and Household Financing Index
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For a variety of reasons, certain sub-pillars of the financing index Hungary performed 
extremely well and the results received can be considered consistent overall. In the 
banking services sub-pillar the Hungarian result, the CEE median and the EU median 
are located extremely close to one another, which can be attributed to the low 
deviation of the applied indicators. Apart from a few outliers, the deviation of the 
national economies under review was relatively low in the calculation of the sub-pillar, 
and the Hungarian value was around the medians shown. In practice, this means that 
the quality of banking services in the area of the EU represents a relatively consistent 
(medium high) level; the difference in competitiveness can be mainly captured in the 
quantity (e.g. pricing) dimension. As regards the sub-pillar of banks’ price setting, 
exceeding the CEE median, Hungary’s value is close to the EU median. This relatively 
good result reflects the fact that company managers have experienced a positive trend 
in banks’ price setting behaviour in recent years; consequently, Hungary achieved 
an impressive ranking in the indicator that captures dynamics. With respect to the 
perception of pricing, we may conclude, overall, that the Hungarian company managers 
responding to the survey perceive a decline in the interest rates – owing to the growth 
stimulating central bank policy since 2013, Hungary’s continuously improving risk 
perception and the favourable external market environment –, but even this level is 
deemed to be high and hardly manageable relative to the company’s profits. 
Figure 3
Hungarian results of the Corporate and Household Financing Index by sub-pillars
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4. Capital Attractiveness Index (CAI)
Another important aspect of banking system competitiveness is the perception 
of the sector on the investor side, which we attempted to measure by way of 
the Capital Attractiveness Index. Whatever the sector, a potential project will not 
be implemented unless it offers the expected rate of return to investors. Based 
on this logic, the banking sector can only develop and contribute meaningfully 
to economic growth if it is an attractive investment for its owners over the long 
term. The banking system’s stability and sustainable risk assumption is a relevant 
issue for investors even beyond compliance with macroprudential requirements, as 
a low capital adequacy level and a substantial non-performing portfolio jeopardises 
long-term profitable operation. In a conducive and stable environment, we deem 
profitability to be the main driver of capital attraction. We attempted to assess this 
factor by weighting together various scaled indicators. 
Achieving the expected return on capital may be influenced by numerous other 
factors; thus, the prevailing structure and the operating and tax environment are 
fundamental upon expansion or entry into a new market. In addition to easily 
comparable indicators (e.g. corporate income tax rate), we captured these 
differences by the (mainly discrete or binary) quantification and summation of 
several qualitative factors. Since growth prospects define a banking system’s 
expansion potential, they carry important information about the sustainability 
of the observed income which, to a large degree, is supported by cost-efficient 
operations. Therefore, we also examined the technological advancement of the 
services and the efficiency of banks and their employees. 
Similar to the composite index of finances, based on their information content, we 
integrated the indicators involved in capital attractiveness into sub-pillars (which 
are not necessarily independent of each other, but exhibit low correlation) (Table 
2). The study of Čihák et al. (2012) was a large-scale attempt to assess and compare 
the quality of banking systems and capital markets through the introduction of 
a new database. The authors defined four main, distinct aspects: size (depth) of the 
financial system; access to financial services; the efficiency of the financial system 
and its stability. We were also inspired by their approach in many regards; their 
classification provided a basis for our own. Since access to financing is adequately 
covered by the Corporate and Household Financing Index, retaining the depth, 
efficiency and stability aspects and adding profitability and selected aspects of the 
operating environment; thus, allowed us to capture the ability to attract capital via 
mutually independent dimensions. As opposed to Čihák et al., our approach clearly 
separates the competitiveness lags associated with the demand side from problems 
arising on the supply side, as the banking system – including the regulator – has 
various options to modify the latter.
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Table 2
Structure of the Capital Attractiveness Index
Main indicators
1) Stability Texas-ratio (ratio of net non-performing loans to regulatory 
capital)
2) Profitability Return on equity, cost-to-income ratio, fee and interest income 
per total assets adjusted for impairment
3) Operating and tax environment Concentration, environment indicator (strength of legal rights, 
adoption of bank levy and duty), corporate income tax
4) Growth possibilities Long-term trend of private loans as a percentage of GDP, 
domestic credit to private sector to GDP, households’ 
indebtedness, ratio of bank loans in corporate finances
5) Technology and efficiency Online banking, ratio of fee and interest income to the number 
of employees, operating expenses per total assets
Our analysis of capital attraction ability was driven by theoretical and practical 
principles alike. With regard to stability, we selected a dense indicator that 
condenses solvency and country-specific efficient resource allocation decisions; that 
is, access to funding is truly limited to customers that are able and willing to repay 
their debt and if not, the banking system allocates prudent reserves to cover the 
losses. The Texas ratio serves this purpose. Similarly, we strived to provide a broad 
interpretation of profitability: we considered not only the existence of profitability, 
but also its cost implications both on the operating side and on the risk side. As 
regards the operating environment, our index is open to additional indicators both 
in relation to the independence and efficiency of the supervisory authority and to 
the simplicity of data supplies and regulatory compliance – EU countries exhibit 
a significant cross-country variability in this respect. A partial solution is provided, 
for example, by the corporate income tax rate, which not only reduces banks’ 
profitability directly but, due to easy comparability, it also captures the diversity in 
the degree of government redistribution. We also tried to capture the concentration 
of market power in the operating environment; however, the direction of the 
effect, in the case of this indicator, is far from being straightforward. Greater 
concentration can be linked to an oligopolistic market (SCP paradigm and the 
“quiet life” hypothesis, see Hicks 1935), which may put participants with a smaller 
market share at a disadvantage, while lower concentration may ease market entry 
as the acquisition of smaller institutions requires less capital. The integration of 
numerous smaller participants into a larger institution may also require substantial 
expenditures. If the market is controlled by a number of large institutions, relatively 
less capital will suffice for the entry without the need for further integration. At 
the same time, the seemingly clear negative correlation between concentration 
and the intensity of competition is not necessarily inevitable even according to the 
literature, see, for example, the results of Berger (1995), Claessens – Laeven (2004) 
and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013). As determining optimal concentration on this 
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basis is not necessarily possible, we defined the average concentration observed in 
the banking systems as the ideal level, and the scores of individual countries were 
calculated based on their distance from the average. We selected the Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) from the indicators applied in the literature, because, unlike 
the CR3 and CR5 indicators (market share of the largest banks), it carries information 
about smaller participants as well. We deemed it more important to capture growth 
prospects than financial depth, because the latter, in our view, is even more driven 
by demand. Besides overheated, investors may also be easily deterred by the lack 
of activity, especially when the subdued demand for credit sets back lending and 
undermines the profitable operation of the institution. In defining the optimal value 
of each indicator (minimum or average), we strived to ensure that both effects 
take hold sufficiently. Although demand is an influential factor in technology as 
well, in this case the banking system has more room for orientation. Since we 
identified this facet of competitiveness with the capital attraction ability of already 
existing banks, efficiency was clearly interpreted as a positive factor; indeed, the 
acquisition of inefficient institutions – notwithstanding the benefits gained from cost 
rationalisation – necessitates further investment and organisational realignment. 
After carefully deliberating the potential aspects and indicators (see in more detail 
in Annex 2), with the application of 14 basic indicators we defined the five sub-
pillars included in the table, which we evaluated on a scale of 0–100. As discussed 
in the methodology section, the sub-pillars are included with equal weight in 
the composite index that represents the ability to attract capital. For the sake of 
comparability, the indicators comprising the sub-pillars were also defined by using 
a uniform scale. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we applied correlation analysis 
to dismiss the indicators that carried no additional information, which allowed us 
to rule out any (even moderate) correlation between the sub-pillars; consequently, 
they can be considered independent. It should be noted that our analysis does not 
distinguish between domestic and foreign owned banks in the countries under 
review, and in this context, we relied on consolidated data throughout the analysis.
Based on the Capital Attractiveness Index (Figure 4), we found that the stragglers 
are made up of countries where stability considerations represent the biggest 
bottleneck: Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Portugal. The leaders are Baltic and 
Scandinavian banking systems (all Baltic states were included in the first ten), 
which can be attributed to their well-balanced, prudent, cost-efficient and 
sufficiently digitalised operation. These national economies were far less involved in 
overheated, predatory lending before the crisis; therefore the growth sacrifice they 
faced during the period of crisis management was less severe. Spain and the United 
Kingdom were also ranked among the first ten countries with regard to capital 
attraction ability. Their privileged position can be partly attributed to the prominent, 
central role they played in the banking of Latin America and Europe (cross-border 
financing) before the crisis. All of these countries had taken considerable efforts to 
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rejuvenate their less efficiently working banks through digital innovation and the 
positive effects of this changeover have become tangible by now.
Similar to the Corporate and Household Financing Index, in the ranking of the Capital 
Attractiveness Index Hungary can be found in the last third of the sample and scored 
below the CEE average, preceding only Romania and Slovenia. An analysis of the five 
sub-pillars of capital attractiveness (Figure 5) reveals that Hungary actually exceeds 
the CEE average in respect of stability. This can be mainly attributed to post-crisis 
parent bank capital injections, recent central bank stabilisation measures and the 
profitable operation of a few larger participants. As regards the profitability pillar, 
Hungary brings up the rear: while it ranked first in net fee and interest income per 
total assets, its final score was strongly deteriorated by its high risk cost and cost-
to-income ratio. Looking at the operating and tax environment, Hungary is in the 
first half thanks to its corporate income tax rate and market concentration, but the 
environment index pushes the score of the Hungarian banking system towards the 
middle of the ranking. Owing to the subdued trend in lending and the opportunities 
presented in household lending, the growth dimension shows a positive potential for 
Hungary. Finally, only Romania and Bulgaria scored worse than Hungary in technology 
and efficiency, with the negative contribution of all indicators considered. This is the 
area where Hungary exhibited the most pronounced lag.
Figure 4
MNB Capital Attractiveness Index
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5. MNB Banking System Competitiveness Index (BSCI)
The static contradiction between the consumer and the investor side 
competitiveness shifts over time, and in the long run they may become mutually 
reinforcing factors. In our opinion, a competitive banking system provides broadly 
available, high quality services at prices that adapt to investors’ return expectations 
while also being affordable for the consumer side. By contrast, if a given country’s 
ability to attract capital is limited and thus it cannot develop an adequate banking 
infrastructure, financial deepening will falter and in the absence of economies of 
scale, the efficiency of financial intermediation will decline. More expensive and 
lower quality service and diminishing access deteriorate the efficiency of operations, 
which in turn reduces the return on equity and undermines the ability to attract 
capital even further. Therefore, in the long run bank supply should adapt to the 
aspects of demand not only in view of the lessons of the past but also recognising 
the accelerating technological changes of the future, which will slowly reach the 
financial intermediary system as well.
Figure 5
Hungarian results of MNB Capital Attractiveness Index by sub-pillars
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In the previous sections we attempted to assess the competitiveness of the 
banking system from the perspective of clients on one side and bank capital on the 
other. However, each approach is insufficient and lopsided in and of itself: a truly 
competitive banking system satisfies both, resolving the contradictions between the 
two sides as much as possible. In the MNB’s final Banking System Competitiveness 
Index both sub-indices were considered in order to measure which countries are 
most successful in reconciling consumer and investor interests in the operation of 
the banking system.3 
According to our survey and in consideration of both sides under review, Northern 
countries and some of the core EU Member States exhibited the strongest banking 
system competitiveness. Despite the struggling big banks of Germany’s Deutsche 
Bank and Commerzbank, Germany’s banking system is rather competitive, probably 
due to the less procyclical Savings Banks. The score of most Central and Eastern 
European Member States – including Hungary – was below average overall. The 
banking systems of South-East European and Mediterranean countries – Portugal, 
Italy and Greece – proved to be the weakest in terms of competitiveness. 
Hungary is in the league of Latvia, Ireland and Poland as well as two North-Western 
Balkan states (Slovenia and Croatia). Hungary has room for improvement both on 
the demand and the supply side, but the two aspects coincide especially in the 
need for improvement in digitalisation and operational efficiency. Moreover, an 
opportunity to progress presents itself in the efficiency improvements that can be 
achieved by a more competitive banking system through the reduction of credit 
spreads and lending costs, which may ensure the Hungarian banking system’s 
contribution to economic growth and its socially accepted role in the allocation of 
resources over the long run.
3  The two sub-indices were weighted together in various ways, but the results proved to be robust. Below 
we present the result received from the arithmetic mean.
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It is worth cross-checking our results against those found by other international 
surveys available in this subject. As we indicated in the introduction, such 
a comprehensive comparison is not available in the area of the banking system, 
but the competitiveness rankings partially include an analysis of some aspects of 
financial intermediation. For the purposes of the comparison, we relied on the 
“Doing Business” (World Bank 2017), “Global Competitiveness Report” (Schwab 
2017) and the “World Competitiveness Yearbook” (IMD 2017) surveys, with each 
survey containing 4–9 indicators of the banking system. Correlations between 
the average scores and rankings received with regard to the questions dedicated 
to financial intermediation exhibited a fairly similar pattern in the surveys (Table 
3). The results of the WEF and IMD rankings strongly correlated with ours (r > 
0.79 in each case), while the correlation with the rankings of the Doing Business 
survey was weaker (r = 0.48 for the scores and r = 0.51 for the rankings). However, 
it is important to note that the Doing Business survey does not correlate more 
positively with the other two competitiveness rankings either, because it explicitly 
focuses on the business environment of SMEs, while the other rankings examine 
Figure 6
The 28 countries of the EU based on the MNB Banking System Competitiveness Index
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the operation and profitability of the banking system based on a somewhat broader 
criteria system.
Table 3
Cross-checking of the MNB’s Banking System Competitiveness Index
Correlation coefficients World Bank – Doing 
Business
World Economic Forum 
– Global 
Competitiveness Report
IMD – World 
Competitiveness 
Yearbook
MNB BSCI 0.47 0.89 0.86
MNB CHFI 0.47 0.79 0.87
MNB CAI 0.30 0.70 0.48
Source: MNB.
6. Summary
The goal of our analysis was to propose an interpretation of banking system 
competitiveness and more importantly, to provide a quantifiable international 
comparison across European Union Member States. Since we were unable 
to locate any other international survey commensurate with the depth and 
comprehensiveness of our study, we faced new dilemmas both during the selection 
and the classification of our indicators. In order to resolve the fundamental conflicts, 
in our survey we examined the subject from two different perspectives (consumer 
and investor). Based on this, we constructed a financing index and a capital 
attractiveness index before combining the two indices into a single composite 
competitiveness index. Since the most favourable solution in the long run is to 
satisfy the two systems of preferences simultaneously, the MNB’s Banking System 
Competitiveness Index reflects a combination of these two indices. In order to 
prevent the comparison from reflecting the cyclical position of the economy, we 
focused primarily on structural indicators; therefore, the analysis should be updated 
at two-year intervals.
We hope that our findings can be used for purposes other than ranking, perhaps 
providing a basis for the identification of neuralgic points and areas for future 
improvement. Our research may be carried forward in two dimensions: firstly, by 
enhancing the index and by expanding – and regularly updating – the indicator 
system. In this context, in the dimensions of the sub-pillars presented in our study 
a broad-based and consolidated data collection system and the introduction of 
comprehensive international polls may prove to be useful. Secondly, the link 
between the banking system and the competitiveness of the national economy 
merits a more thorough analysis; in particular, the channels through which the 
banking system may contribute to the competitiveness of a given country. The 
latter research, we hope, may draw from the initial results presented in this study.
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Annex
Annex 1: Basic indicators of the Corporate and Household Finances Index
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Annex 2: Basic indicators of capital attractiveness
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